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Taking Stock
 
Pharmacoeconomics and outcomes research have
grown rapidly over the past decade. The field has es-
tablished professional legitimacy—whether measured
by academic, corporate, or government research pro-
grams, number of scientific articles published, profes-
sionals in the field, or impact on healthcare policy [1].
But we are still quite far from the desired goal of
knowing how to rank drugs and other medical inter-
ventions in terms of cost-effectiveness and humanistic
outcomes, to achieve fair and efficient allocation of
scarce healthcare resources. And we’re even further
from consistently implementing medical decisions
based on such criteria. Healthcare plans around the
world still too often choose medications based on the
cost per pill, rather than on the full cost of treatment
decisions on patients and all providers. Medical deci-
sions are still too frequently based on naïve extrapo-
lations of short-term clinical findings, rather than on
rigorous outcomes studies.
There’s compelling logic to the notion that
medical decisions should take into account the ac-
tual (and complete) effects of treatments on pa-
tients, and that money shouldn’t be thrown away
needlessly. But there are formidable obstacles to
advancement as well. Evidence-based medicine is
not practiced by many clinicians even when the
outcomes evidence is incontrovertible. For exam-
ple, despite the overwhelming evidence for statin
therapy benefit in secondary prevention of cardio-
vascular disease from the 4S, CARE, and LIPID
studies [2–4], only 30% of North American, Euro-
pean, and Asian-Pacific patients surviving a myo-
cardial infarction are prescribed lipid-lowering med-
ications, and only 10% of United Kingdom patients
actually receive treatment [5–7].
Health plans often split financial decision-mak-
ing responsibilities among departmental “silos,”
and healthcare decisions are often made by admin-
istrators who have little appreciation for evidence-
based medicine. As a result, a highly cost-effective
outpatient treatment may not be fully utilized if it
increases the pharmacy budget, even when the
hospitalization cost reduction more than offsets
the pharmacy increase [8]. Most of these problems
can and will erode over time as better healthcare
provider information management and incentive
systems are implemented.
There is one problem that will continue to rele-
gate pharmacoeconomics and outcomes research
to “not ready for prime time” status for the fore-
seeable future: the failure of the healthcare “out-
comes” market. As Berger pointed out, most trans-
acted goods and services are tangible (e.g., apples,
TV sets, haircuts, airplane flights) and readily un-
derstandable by consumers in terms of value for
dollar spent [9]. Healthcare, in contrast, is prima-
rily bought in aggregate and in advance by third-
party payers. The buying and selling of healthcare
 
outcomes
 
 (with the exception of routine items like
eyeglasses and tooth extractions) is practically
nonexistent. The reasons are complex. Some prob-
lems are that outcomes are widely variable; they
are only partially known or understood, and
therefore they are often believed to be beyond the
control and/or responsibility of the clinician. Mar-
keting “squishy” healthcare results would jeopar-
dize the multitrillion-dollar healthcare political
economy that we now organize through the sales
(or government distribution) of tangible health-
care inputs—pharmaceuticals, physician office vis-
its, hospitalizations, diagnostic tests, and so forth.
Why are healthcare outcomes so variable, poorly
understood, and presumed not to be the responsibil-
ity of healthcare providers? Why do societies spend
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so little of their healthcare resources on rigorous
outcomes research (in the United States, certainly
less than 0.5%—$5 billion annually out of a $1 tril-
lion healthcare sector)? These questions are seldom
asked by the healthcare establishment, while tens of
billions of dollars are spent each year on marketing
healthcare organizations, products, and services. In
a recent scientific conference, we proposed an an-
swer [10]. The next two sections summarize our di-
agnosis and proposed solution to the problem.
 
The Failure of the Outcomes Market
 
Economists look to sources of market failure to
explain these sorts of social welfare distortions.
And in this case one doesn’t have to look very far.
Rigorously establishing the therapeutic outcomes
for any pair of comparative medical interventions
costs money—in some cases hundreds of millions
of dollars. Once the research is completed, unless
the treatment has strong patent protection, there is
little opportunity for manufacturers or anyone
else to recover the costs of the outcomes research.
Thus, the private market sector will tend to under-
provide outcomes research.
Suppose, for example, a managed care organiza-
tion (MCO) were to undertake a rigorous random-
ized controlled outcomes and cost-effectiveness
comparison of medical vs. surgical interventions
for benign prostatic hyperplasia. To do this, they
would have to recruit hundreds of patients for the
various treatment arms and follow them for sev-
eral years. If done rigorously, this could easily be a
$100 million clinical study and there would be no
market mechanism for reimbursing this forward-
thinking MCO for their research efforts. At the
end of the study, all its competitors would simply
adapt the treatment guidelines that the MCO had
demonstrated to be clinically optimal and cost-
effective. The $100 million it had spent on legiti-
mate outcomes research would merely make the
MCO less competitive.
Consider the decision to invest in rigorous out-
comes research on vitamin E. Such research would
generate no additional profit for a sponsoring
manufacturer, because vitamin E is nonpatentable,
is widely available from numerous manufacturers,
and is sold over the counter (OTC) without pre-
scription. Current scientific evidence suggests that
vitamin E, a potent antioxidant, may have the
ability to substantially reduce cardiovascular dis-
ease [11–13]. If vitamin E were as efficacious as
predicted, the potential annual US benefits in re-
duced direct and indirect costs of cardiovascular
disease of establishing its efficacy could exceed
$25 billion. The cost of undertaking this research
would be substantially less than $1 billion. Vita-
min E has also been suggested to have favorable
effects on some types of cancer and also on Alzhei-
mer’s disease.
So, if there is a private market failure, why
hasn’t the federal National Institutes of Health
(NIH) moved more aggressively to conduct vita-
min E outcomes research? Dranove looked at NIH
funding of vitamin E studies in some detail [14].
Considering current uncertainties about future pay-
offs, he found that the expected benefit-cost ratio
of additional NIH-funded research on vitamin E
may be as high as 500:1. Scientific speculation
regarding vitamin E’s potential benefits has ex-
isted for nearly three decades. Should vitamin E
ultimately be proven to have clinical value in heart
disease and elsewhere, more than half a trillion
dollars in unnecessary healthcare and economic
productivity will have been lost in the United
States alone—because of the inability of the pri-
vate healthcare market to financially capitalize on
promising scientific speculation.
Aspirin is another example. It was recognized
long ago that the antiplatelet effects of aspirin
may benefit heart attack and stroke victims. But
there has been little profit in aspirin, a generic
OTC product, and no incentive for a profit-seek-
ing company to justify expansion of the aspirin
market by conducting rigorous clinical trials to
demonstrate outcomes benefits. When the studies
to establish these clinical benefits were finally con-
ducted by the NIH in the 1980s, patients had been
suffering unnecessary cardiovascular disease and
death for more than three decades [15,16].
Even today, not all post–myocardial infarction
patients are prescribed aspirin when clinically in-
dicated [17–19], because, in dramatic contrast to
patented drugs where direct-to-consumer advertis-
ing has been very effective in increasing consumer
and provider awareness, new information regard-
ing the benefits of a well-known drug such as aspi-
rin percolates slowly to providers and patients—
when the drug is a generic, OTC product. The fail-
ure of drug-pricing policies to quickly reward so-
cially relevant pharmaceutical research and devel-
opment (R & D) in these two cases has had
enormous societal cost.
One answer to the problem of private health-
care markets failing to adequately fund healthcare
economic and outcomes research is to boost gov-
ernment spending. Such a step is unlikely to re-
solve the issue, however. If it has taken the NIH so
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many years to study vitamin E when the expected
societal payoffs are so great, they are not going to
quickly fund other outcomes studies with less ob-
vious potential benefit. In any case, major expan-
sion of NIH spending is not on the horizon, cer-
tainly not for outcomes research.
When we look at other countries, there is little
evidence that government spending is solving the
problem of developing reliable healthcare economic
and outcomes information. In fact, the govern-
ments of many smaller countries spend less on
healthcare R & D of any kind, instead relying on
larger and richer countries to sort out the safety,
efficacy, cost, and value of new healthcare tech-
nologies as they are developed.
 
Fixing the Outcomes Market: The Use 
Patent Proposal
 
Nearly every day some long-established medical
wisdom on treatment outcomes is overturned. A
recent study indicates that prophylactic antibiotics
for dental procedures to prevent endocarditis in
patients with heart valve abnormalities may be un-
necessary [20]. This treatment has been recom-
mended by both the American Dental Association
and the American Heart Association for nearly 50
years. Whether or not the new evidence is ulti-
mately convincing, one can question the eviden-
tiary basis for medical practice if such stable treat-
ment guidelines can be brought into question with
a single case-control study. When medical practice
recommendations are endorsed by official health-
care organizations, why aren’t the supporting eco-
nomic and outcomes data airtight, solid, and fully
transparent?
The key problem is that standard patents pro-
tect the intellectual property tied up in medical
product development, but not in medical treat-
ments or outcomes. They make no provision to
ensure appropriate use of drugs to ensure patient
outcomes, and they provide no incentive to gener-
ate new knowledge once the patent expires. The
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) generally
only requires evaluation of new medications on
small-sample short-term safety and efficacy stud-
ies. These studies often use surrogate endpoints,
because it is less expensive to show that a drug re-
duces blood pressure, cholesterol, or serum glu-
cose, for example, than to demonstrate that the
drug actually reduces heart disease, stroke, kidney
disease, or mortality.
There is even less economic incentive—outside
of government-funded research—to develop new
surgical interventions or other procedures and to
rigorously prove their clinical and economic value
in comparison to alternative medical or standard
surgical interventions. Why? Medical procedures,
such as surgical interventions, receive extremely
limited patent protection. Sometimes the specific
tools (e.g., laser knives) or devices (e.g., coronary
stents) are patented, but doctors can’t usually
patent a new surgical procedure. It is fair to say
that much less is known about the ultimate bene-
fits, risks, and costs of medical and surgical proce-
dures than even the basic information required by
the FDA to market drugs or medical devices.
Outcomes research would improve dramati-
cally if patent law were enhanced to provide a
clear period of marketing exclusivity protection
for specific proven healthcare interventions, pro-
cedures, or uses of medications, devices, and other
products. “Use patents” exist under current patent
law, but they don’t have strong enforceability pro-
visions. This enhanced use patent protection would
be awarded to applicants based on rigorous ran-
domized controlled clinical trial evidence on pre-
specified outcome endpoints. If the applicant were
the first to demonstrate to regulators (e.g., the
FDA) that the therapy (medical, surgical, etc.) had
specific clinical benefits, they would be granted
marketing exclusivity for that specific use for some
period (e.g., 5 years). This use patent would be
granted even if they did not hold the original prod-
uct patent on underlying medications or devices.
Regulators would decide how broad such use
patents would be, given the quality and compre-
hensiveness of the supporting evidence. Use pat-
ents could be obtained on generic and OTC prod-
ucts, as well as patented products and product
combinations. The successful applicant would be
granted marketing exclusivity for a specific use of
a drug or other product, even when the product
has been on the market for many years. Anyone
purchasing the product for the specific protected
use would have to pay the use patent holder over
and above the generic price of the product.
Enforcement of use patents would be more
complicated and difficult than enforcement of
product patents. But the enforcement costs have to
be weighed against the potential societal benefits
of expanded outcomes knowledge. The enforce-
ment issue is not quite as onerous as some might
think. Suppose a firm successfully obtained a use
patent for vitamin E in the prevention of heart at-
tack. If there were a doctor’s prescription for vita-
min E, there would be a clear trail of evidence that
the use patent royalties should be paid. If there
 184
 
Hay and Yu
 
were no doctor’s prescription, the doctor could be
accused of failure to provide community standard
of care. Having to carefully document all medical
services provided, doctors would be very reluctant
to participate in schemes to avoid use patent pro-
tection.
It would be impossible to prevent every in-
fringement of healthcare use patents; the situation
is analogous to copyright protection of videotapes
and software. But failure to monitor and enforce
use patents by large healthcare and provider orga-
nizations would make them vulnerable to law-
suits, just as corporations encouraging or ignoring
employee software piracy can be sued now.
 
Conclusions
 
Protection of intellectual property has long been
recognized as crucial to economic growth and
technological advancement. Product patent pro-
tection laws have made available innovative drugs,
devices, and diagnostics with innumerable bene-
fits. But there is still room for improvement. Un-
der the current system, most intellectual property
in medicine, particularly how treatments actually
affect patient outcomes, is unprotected, and it thus
fails to be utilized to its fullest or to expand to its
creative maximum.
Many countries (e.g., Canada, Australia) now
mandate that pharmacoeconomics and outcomes
data be formally presented by pharmaceutical
manufacturers for reimbursement decisions. But
the required evidence is often simple modeling of
surrogate clinical markers from short-term drug
approval studies, rather than rigorous prospective
randomized controlled outcomes studies. More-
over, even if more rigorous studies were mandated
by these government agencies, they would only af-
fect initial reimbursement decisions for patented
pharmaceuticals, rather than encouraging ongoing
outcomes research with potential new patent pro-
tection for all products, including generics.
The implementation and rigorous enforcement
for healthcare use patents would align medical
R & D expenditures much more closely with what
society, healthcare providers, and individual pa-
tients demand. Rather than taking advantage of
providing a minimum level of information to ob-
tain FDA marketing approval, managed care orga-
nizations and pharmaceutical and device manufac-
turers would have market-based incentives to prove
the benefits of therapy in lives saved and illnesses
avoided.
 
Government regulation of pharmaceuticals has
proceeded from early concerns about drug and
substance purity 100 years ago, to concerns about
product safety and efficacy 50 years ago, to con-
cerns about product effectiveness today. It is inevi-
table that society will increasingly demand more
rigorous evidence on the outcomes of treatment,
and will require new mechanisms to ensure that
such studies are conducted.
There is no natural constituency for improve-
ment in outcomes and health economics research.
Patients (i.e., consumers or voters) don’t get upset
about therapies not yet proven. Politicians don’t
lose elections on the failure to fund vitamin E or
other outcomes research, but rather on whether or
not patients have access to familiar government-
funded healthcare programs, doctors, hospitals,
and drugs. Private markets don’t reward outcomes
research, because competitors can take advantage
of any new findings (e.g., new treatment practice
guidelines) without investing in the research. Pro-
tecting rights to the valuable intellectual property
created by healthcare outcomes studies through
use patents would stimulate vital new R & D. It
would also go a long way toward putting pharma-
coeconomics and outcomes research into the prime-
time spotlight, where they belong.
 
No financial support was provided by any source for this
work. The views expressed here are solely those of the
authors. They do not reflect the official views of Value in
Health, the Value in Health Editors or Advisors, the In-
ternational Society for Pharmacoeconomics and Out-
comes Research, or any other organization or group.
 
References
 
1 Elixhauser A, Halpern M, Schmier J, Luce B. Health
care CBA and CEA from 1991 to 1996: an updated
bibliography. Med Care 1998;36:MS1–9.
2 Scandinavian Simvastatin Survival Study Group.
Randomised trial of cholesterol lowering in 4444
patients with coronary heart disease: the Scandina-
vian Simvastatin Survival Study (4S). Lancet 1994;
344:1383–9.
3 Sacks FM, Pfeffer MA, Move LA, et al. The effect
of pravastatin on coronary events after myocardial
infarction in patients with average cholesterol lev-
els. N Engl J Med 1996;335:1001–9.
4 The long-term intervention with pravastatin in Is-
chaemic Disease (LIPID) Study Group. Prevention
of cardiovascular events and death with pravasta-
tin in patients with coronary heart disease and a
broad range of initial cholesterol levels. New Engl
J Med 1998;339:1349–57.
 Expanding the Healthcare “Outcomes” Market
 
185
 
5 Pearson TA, McBride PE, Miller NH, Smith SC.
Task Force 8: organization of preventive cardiol-
ogy service. J Am Coll Cardiol 1996;27:1039–47.
6 Keech A. Risk factor management in CHD pa-
tients in Asia: current status [abstract]. Atheroscle-
rosis 1998;136(Suppl):S31.
7 Bowker TJ, Clayton TC, Ingham J, et al. A British
Cardiac Society survey of the potential for second-
ary prevention of coronary disease: ASPIRE (Ac-
tion on Secondary Prevention through Interven-
tion to Reduce Events). Heart 1996;75:334–42.
8 Bonnette J. Making decisions on lipid therapy: a
managed care perspective. Value Health 1998;
1(4):231–2.
9 Berger M. Willingness to pay versus willingness to
buy: what defines value in healthcare? Value
Health 1998;1(4):201–3.
10 Hay J, Yu W. Drug patents and prices. Can we
achieve better outcomes? In: Triplett J (ed.). Mea-
suring the Prices of Medical Treatments. Washing-
ton, DC: Brookings Press, 1999.
11 Rimm EB, Stampfer MJ, Ascherio A, Giovannucci
E, Colditz GA, Willett WC. Vitamin E consump-
tion and the risk of coronary heart disease in men.
New Engl J Med 1993;328(20):1450–6.
12 Stampfer MJ, Hennekens CH, Manson JE, Colditz
GA, Rosner B, Willett WC. Vitamin E consump-
tion and the risk of coronary heart disease in
women. New Engl J Med 1993;328(20):1444–9.
13 Stephens NG, Parsons A, Schofield PM, Kelly F,
Chesseman K, Mitchinson MJ. Randomised
controlled trial of vitamin E in patients with coro-
nary disease. Cambridge Heart Antioxidant Study
(CHAOS). Lancet 1996;347(9004):781–6.
14 Dranove D. Is there an underinvestment in R & D
about prevention? J Health Economics, 1998; 17
(1):117–27.
15 Steering Committee of the Physician’s Health Study
Research Group. Final report on the aspirin com-
ponent of the ongoing physicians’ health study. N
Engl J Med 1989;321:129–35.
16 Antiplatelet Trialists Collaboration. Secondary pre-
vention of vascular disease by prolonged antiplate-
let treatment. Br Med J 1988;296:320–31.
17 Eisenberg MJ, Califf RM, Cohen EA, Adelman
AG, Mark DB, Topol EJ. Use of evidence-based
medical therapy in patients undergoing percutaneous
coronary revascularization in United States, Europe,
and Canada. Am J Cardiol 1997;79(7): 867–72.
18 Aronow WS. Underutilization of aspirin in older
patients with prior myocardial infarction at the
time of admission to a nursing home. J Am Geriatr
Soc 1998;46(5):615–6.
19 Berger AK, Edris DW, Breall JA, Oetgen WJ, Mar-
ciniak TA, Molinari GF. Resource use and quality
of care for Medicare patients with acute myocar-
dial infarction in Maryland and the District of
Columbia: analysis of data from the Cooperative
Cardiovascular Project. Am Heart J 1998;135
(2 Pt 1):349–56.
20 Strom BL, Abrutyn E, Berlin JA, et al. Dental and
cardiac risk factors for infective endocarditis: a
population-based, case-control study. Ann Intern
Med 1998;129:761–9.
